Wednesday 23 August 2017

Michael Spurr Apologises

Regular readers will be aware of Carl Eve's sustained journalistic efforts regarding the Tanis Bhandari murder and I see that an official apology has been forthcoming from Michael Spurr, as reported here:- 

Apology for mother of man murdered by a known criminal

The man in charge of the service which monitors offenders has written to the mother of a murdered Devon man to apologise for failings which contributed to her son's death. Michael Spurr has written to Andrea Sharpe, mother of Tanis Bhandari, to apologise for errors in the handling of the case of Donald Pemberton, who was convicted of murder. Mr Spurr said he is “truly sorry” about the difficulties the family faced trying to get information about the monitoring of Tanis's murderer, reports plymouthherald.

The chief executive officer of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), said a Serious Further Offence review has revealed a litany of failings. He revealed he was “looking into the processes” by which the reviews were carried out and how the service could improve. He admitted the case was “assessed against current requirements and processes were not followed as they should have been” adding “the SFO review therefore found the management was insufficient in each of these areas”.

Since receiving the letter in late April, Andrea said she has had mixed feelings about its contents. Although she now feels vindicated in battling against the authorities for the truth, the letter has underscored her strong feelings that killer Donald Pemberton should not have been at liberty when he killed Tanis on January 1 2015.

She said: “I felt great relief having read the letter but it opened up worse feelings. For example, learning now that the killer could have been re-arrested on December 30 – that really broke me. He didn’t need to be on the street that night. I don’t know what else I can do now. I feel like I’ve come to an end.”

Tanis, aged 27, was murdered on January 1, 2015 at the Green in Tamerton Foliot by Ryan Williams, aged 21 and Pemberton, 20. Pemberton was on licence at the time, having served two months of a four-month sentence for having a sharp article in a public place. His licence terms stated he was “to be well behaved” but two weeks before the murder he was arrested for brandishing two meat cleavers in Anstis Street in Stonehouse.

As The Herald has since learned, Pemberton's licence details were not on the Police National Computer and he was bailed by police to return to Charles Cross police station on February 9, 2015. His probation worker was not made aware of Pemberton’s arrest until more than a week later thanks to a call from the mental health Insight team. A court date to deal with the breach was eventually arranged to be heard on January 16, 2015.

In December last year The Herald exclusively revealed how two internal investigations – by the police and the privatised arm of the probation service – into the sequence of events which led to the death of the 27-year-old revealed a catalogue of delays, computer inadequacies and human errors.

The police’s internal investigation found “there was a chance” that Donald Pemberton – now serving a life sentence for the joint murder of Tanis – “would not have been at liberty on that night” had key information been available to officers on the Police National Computer “and a recall to prison had been issued for him, as a result of his behaviour” two weeks earlier when he was arrested for threatening a group of men with two meat cleavers.

In addition, the police report found that the circumstances which led to the builder’s death could be repeated not just in Devon and Cornwall, but in any force area in the country because of failings by the prison authorities in informing the Police National Computer Bureau.

The police report warned: “The concern is that Prisons, nationwide are adopting different criteria for sending, or not sending, prisoner licence details to the PNC Bureau. While this practice continues, and until all prisoner licence details are sent to the PNC Bureau, there is every chance incidents similar to this case will recur.”

The Herald, working Tanis’s family, called upon local politicians to put pressure on the government into tackling the issue. In February this year The Herald reported how after meeting with Tanis’ family Plymouth Moor View MP Johnny Mercer wrote to then Justice Minister Liz Truss asking: “what assessment she has made of the implications for her policies of the findings of the Devon and Cornwall Police inquiry into the murder of Tanis Bhandari that omissions in the recording of license conditions on the Police National Computer are likely to recur.”

The question, sent on January 27, was answered by Brandon Lewis, minister of state for policing and the fire service, on February 2. He wrote: “The omission in the recording of licence conditions in this case related to a Post Sentence Supervision notification, which is applied to offenders released from sentences of more than one day and up to two years in custody. This issue has now been resolved. All licence conditions are now recorded on the Police National Computer and prisons are also required to notify local police and probation services when offenders are released from their custody.”

The Herald later learned there had been a follow up question by Mr Mercer to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, asking “on what date the issue of the omission relating to the recording of licence conditions on the Police National Computer was resolved”. It received the answer from Mr Lewis: “This issue was resolved on 19 April 2016.”

The internal police report, which discovered the issue of the PNC omissions regarding licence details, was signed by the investigating officer dated September 9, 2016. The police have said their report was not forwarded to any government department prior to its completion in September 2016. There is, as yet, no explanation from the Government as to how it resolved the nationwide error found by Devon and Cornwall Police before the force had even completed its internal report.

In his lengthy letter to Andrea Sharpe, Tanis’s mother, Michael Spurr noted how because of Pemberton being a youth offender and previously receiving a custodial sentence of less than 12 months for the meat cleaver incident, any breach of his supervision was not a separate criminal offence and meant he could not be recalled direct to prison on the day of the breach. Instead, he would have to appear at court at a later date.

He noted how Pemberton, having been sentenced to four months custody after being convicted of the possession of an offensive weapon, was released on October 31 on a three month Notice of Supervision. He admitted the “releasing establishment should have informed the police of his release so that this information could be uploaded to the Police National Computer (PNC) to record that Donald Pemberton was subject to supervision.

“Unfortunately, this did not happen and I apologise for this. The failure was that of a particular prison establishment rather than a system failure.” He went on to reveal that Pemberton kept two of his three appointments with his “Probation Service Officer (PSO) in November 2014 and was issued a warning for the missed appointment. He explained how the PSO “identified at an early stage that [Pemberton] had mental health issues and set up an appointment with his GP”.

In addition, he admitted that by early December the CRC [Community Rehabilitation Company] which took over the privatised arm of the Probation Service “had concerns about his compliance with his supervision and about his ongoing mental health problems, which were significant enough to require a short period of hospitalisation”.

Mr Spurr revealed how over the “next two weeks” Pemberton was seen by his PSO and by the mental health team. Following Pemberton’s arrest on December 15, 2014 he was bailed until February 9, 2015. Mr Spurr said he “cannot comment” on the police’s decision, but notes Devon and Cornwall Police internal review of the case.

He wrote: “We did not to tell [sic] the police about the Notice of Supervision as we should have done, but the PNC would have included a list of Pemberton’s previous convictions including his recent incarceration in a youth offender’s institution. As you are aware the investigating officers did not check the PNC, therefore were not aware of his previous convictions and did not identify he may have been subject to supervision.”

The Herald learned from the internal reports by the police and CRC that Pemberton’s PSO only found out on December 22, 2014 he had been arrested and bail, thanks to a call from staff at the Insight Mental Health Team. This delay meant attempts to discuss the matter further with the arresting officer and discussions with the National Probation Service (NPS) were equally delayed.

Mr Spurr has now revealed that the NPS enforcement officer “had some concerns as to whether there was enough evidence to prosecute the breach, as [Pemberton] had not been charged”. This was despite police investigators already securing and viewing very clear CCTV evidence of Pemberton threatening a group of men with two meat cleavers.

Mr Spurr notes that following further discussion about the risk Pemberton posed, “a decision was made to summons [him] to appear in court. On 24 December, a court date of 16 January was set.” He also revealed that the enforcement officer chose not to go to court to request an arrest warrant be issue as Pemberton had not yet been charged and had a fixed home address.

However, he confirmed that Pemberton “then missed an appointment with his PSO on the 29 December and unsuccessful attempts were made to contact him by phone on 30 December. “Following missed appointments, if an offender does not have a reasonable explanation for missing the appointment enforcement action is taken, however, in this case breach proceedings had already been instigated so there was no further follow up.”

Mr Spurr accepted Andrea Sharpe and her family were “entitled to be informed by the Witness Care Unit” of her right to ask for a Serious Further Offence Victim Summary Reports (VSR) and to be informed about the Victim Contact Service (VCS).

Tanis’s family only found out they were entitled to a report from the Probation Service about the monitoring of Pemberton because they were told by The Herald. Until that stage they had not been contacted by the Witness Care Unit and were completely unaware they were legally entitled to the VSR. Even their Devon and Corwnall Police Family Liaison Officer was unaware of the Victim Summary Report and that they should have been contacted about seeing it.

Mr Spurr said he has since asked Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) Victims Policy team to work with Witness Care Units “to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities and to reduce the chances of this very important piece of work being overlooked.” He admitted that in relation to Tanis’s family’s experience the HMPPS Victims Policy team has “already made contact with the Devon and Cornwall Witness Care Unit and they have now reviewed their processes.”

Mr Spurr said he recognised it had been a very difficult year for Andrea, compounded by trying to obtain information about the case while still grieving the loss of her son. He wrote: “I am truly sorry about the difficulties you have faced and the additional distress this has caused you.”

As a result he said he would be “looking into the processes by which SFO reviews are carried out. In this regard, I am considering how we can ensure that the SFO review procedures promote a culture of openness about learning; produce robust reviews; provide victims with information on how was [sic] offender was supervised and; where there were shortcomings, how any lessons learnt will be implemented.

He said current SFO Review procedures asked three questions “whether Risk Assessment was sufficient, whether Risk Management was sufficient and whether Offender Management was sufficient”. Assessing the case of Pemberton’s management against current requirements he admitted “processes were not followed, as they should have been. The SFO review therefore found the management was insufficient in each of these areas.”

He admitted the written assessment and plan of Pemberton “was not completed in a timely manner, was of insufficient quality and was not reviewed in response to changing circumstances”. He admitted there was “an escalating pattern of worrying behaviour that was not sufficiently spotted and risk escalation to the NPS was not considered”. In addition, he noted that the Probation Service Officer who tried to contact Pemberton on December 30, after he missed his appointment on December 29, “took no further action” after this date.

Mr Spurr said the SFO review “found that more should have been done at this point, including risk escalation to the NPS and consideration of contacting police. (The SFO review also stated it was not clear what action the police could have taken if any). I have looked at the review and concluded that a warrant could have been applied for at this point.”

While recognising the context of the decision making at the time and the police’s decision to bail Pemberton, Mr Spurr said “there were sufficient concerns about the possession of weapons and the risk Pemberton posed to justify an application and it would then have been for the Court to decide whether to issue the warrant.”

As a result of Tanis’s family’s battle to highlight the mistakes made and hold organisations to account, Mr Spurr outlined a series of future actions to “prevent, as far as we can, further offending in the future”. Among the raft of actions already agreed include underscoring the importance of prison establishments to notify police and the PNC Bureau about the release of offenders and details of their licences. He said this importance had been “reinforced and further reminders will be issued”.

In addition an audit “will be undertaken to make sure the relevant Prison Service Instruction is being followed”. He said HM Prisons and Probation Service was working with police “to improve the type of information stored on the PNC” but claimed the “technical changes” to the PNC were “a police matter so I cannot commit to a time scale for this piece of work to be completed”.

He said HMPPS would also issue guidance on the use of warrants “making clear the circumstances in which they should be used for public protection, including for any young offenders who may still be subject to the previous Notice of Supervision arrangements”.

He said the HMPPS “Contract Management Team” undertook an audit of liaison arrangements and relationships with “key stakeholders in the Dorset, Devon and Cornwall CRC”, adding that the findings would be “discussed with the CRC Chief Executive Officer and senior managers” to agree any further improvements required.

In addition, he said the CRC had implemented a “new case management model, including an evidence based risk assessment and allocation process and a centralised administrative and information sharing function”. Finally he said he would review the current SFO review procedures “with the aim to provide more comprehensive and straightforward reports to be shared with victims”.

11 comments:

  1. Yet despite this catalogue of 'insufficiencies' Spurr is still in a £150k a year job & receives annual bonuses of £20k.

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  2. That the police bailed him without checking to see if he had previous convictions was the fatal, incompetent decision. Even if the licence details had been on the computer at the time it would have made no difference to the granting of police bail.

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  3. This is a catalogue of disasters, one after another, all of which could have been so easily avoided if proper systems were in place and if prisons, probation and police gave a damn instead of the jobsworth response of "it's not my job" to do X or Y

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  4. Can we have an inquiry into the inconsistencies in Spurr's account...

    * the written assessment and plan of Pemberton “was not completed in a timely manner, was of insufficient quality and was not reviewed in response to changing circumstances”. He admitted there was “an escalating pattern of worrying behaviour that was not sufficiently spotted and risk escalation to the NPS was not considered”.

    * the NPS enforcement officer “had some concerns as to whether there was enough evidence to prosecute the breach, as [Pemberton] had not been charged”.

    * the PSO “identified at an early stage that [Pemberton] had mental health issues and set up an appointment with his GP”

    To Precis Spurr - Clearly it was all someone else's fault. Sorry. Dreadful & All That. £20k bonus please. Thank You. Business as Usual. Facts Just An Inconvenience.

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  5. When the financier John Monkton was murdered there was a well-publicised serious review that was released in its entirety... staff were suspended and the London chief officer was fired. In contrast, when others without the profile and connections of John Monkton suffer similar fates, there is less openness and less accountability. All you get is 'truly sorry' verbiage.

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  6. Instead of private organisations being allowed to use 'corporate confidentiality' when charged with providing public services and being able to hide anything they like by just saying 'corporate confidentiality', the tables should be turned.
    If you take on a contract that provides a public service, then you should be made to play by the same rules as 'in house' public services, and be subject to the same scrutiny by public office and FOI regulations as they are.

    'Getafix

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  7. Apologies that have only been given after extreme pressure and demands carry very little weight.
    Sorry because I have to be, not because I really am.

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  8. Perhaps Michael Spurr should also extend his apologies to HMIP.

    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/the-prisons-inspectorate-when-the-recommendations-are-ignored-what-is-the-point-a7900321.html

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  9. All SFO reviews advise you it is not about you. This is bullshit. A review makes you feel like you are responsible for the sfo. Action plans basically mean forensic OASys details which would take all day. Like OAsys protects. Only we see it. Useless document aside from the risk assessment bit. Accountable we are. Not like these toadies.

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  10. 'Mr Spurr notes that following further discussion about the risk Pemberton posed, “a decision was made to summons [him] to appear in court. On 24 December, a court date of 16 January was set.” He also revealed that the enforcement officer chose not to go to court to request an arrest warrant be issue as Pemberton had not yet been charged and had a fixed home address.'

    He has deliberately used the word "chose" in relation to the enforcement officer-to blame the staff member; in reality, he was not charged, he seems to have been engaging with Mental Health and had a fixed address; on PSS so not eligible for recall to hmp. Spurr suggests they should have sought a warrant and left it to the court to action, or not. We know they would not have remanded him in custody, but then Spurr could blame the Courts. Even if they had issued a warrant, unlikely the police would execute in a timely fashion; we in the NPS currently have warrants outstanding where licences' have been revoked, weeks ago. We regularly call Police to tell them where the subject can be found.

    He completely misses the point that his Government, his inept colleague, Chris Grayling pushed through changes to the Probation Service, without systems, processes of communication etc having been put in place. When they were aware, remember that pesky 'risk list' and ample evidence - foresaw these offences happening, but they went ahead anyway.

    I wonder also about the risk escalation suggestion; I doubt any SPO in NPS would have accepted this as an escalation, until conviction and in many respects, the CRC's want to keep their numbers; given they regularly complain that too many go to NPS.

    I am intrigued about the VSU issues, as in NPS we cannot get them involved unless, case has a violent/sexual offence/conviction in excess of 12 months imprisonment...no idea how this works with PSS cases.

    The incident and unfortunately the death was predictable, whilst they have always been around, i.e. sonnex - again where police and court information never linked up, but organisations shirk their responsibilities and happily leave it at the door of individual members of staff.

    The whole system is wrecked.

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  11. How many more sfo's will there be. Especially when we will have no access to oasys or nd. 5 days ago one of my cases remanded and the info is still not on the system. When caseloads are too high to manage surely there is something wrong with the system. MOJ's answer is to tick another box.

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